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 1 Progress and Challenges for Patient Safety 
 Twenty-fi ve years ago the fi eld of patient safety, apart from a number of early pio-
neers, did not exist and the lack of research and attention to medical accidents could 
reasonably be described as negligent (Vincent  1989 ). There is now widespread 
acceptance and awareness of the problem of medical harm and, in the last decade, 
considerable efforts have been made to improve the safety of healthcare. Progress 
has however been slower than originally anticipated and the earlier optimism has 
been replaced by a more realistic longer-term perspective. There has undoubtedly 
been substantial progress but we believe that future progress, particularly in the 
wider healthcare system, will require a broader vision of patient safety. In this chap-
ter we briefl y review progress on patient safety and consider the principal future 
challenges as we see them. 
 Progress on Patient Safety 
 With the massive attention now given to patient safety it is easy to forget how dif-
fi cult it was in earlier years to even fi nd clear accounts of patient harm, never mind 
describe and analyse them. Medico-legal fi les, oriented to blame and compensation 
rather than safety, were the principal source of information (Lee and Domino  2002 ). 
In contrast narrative case histories and accompanying analyses and commentary are 
now widely available. Analyses of incidents are now routinely performed, albeit 
often in a framework of accountability rather than in the spirit of refl ection and 
learning. 
 Major progress has been made in assessing the nature and scale of harm in many 
countries. The fi ndings of the major record review studies are widely accepted 
(de Vries et al.  2008 ) and numerous other studies have catalogued the nature and 
extent of surgical adverse events, infection, adverse drug events and other safety 
issues. The measurement and monitoring of safety continues to be a challenge but 
progress has been made in developing reliable indicators of safety status (Vincent 
et al.  2013 ,  2014 ). 
2 Analyses of safety incidents have revealed a wide range of contributory factors 
and that individual staff are often the inheritors of wider system problems (Reason 
 1997 ). However, some safety problems can be linked to the sub-standard perfor-
mance of individuals, whether wilful or due to sickness or incapacity (Francis 
 2012 ). Regulation of both organisations and individuals is increasing and every 
healthcare professional now has a clear duty to report consistent poor performance 
from a colleague. Drawing attention to safety issues is actively encouraged at the 
highest levels, although many whistle-blowers are still shabbily treated and perse-
cuted for their efforts. All of these developments represent an increasing concern 
with safety and determination to improve basic standards. 
 Substantial progress has also been made in mapping and understanding safety 
issues. Surgery, for instance, was long ago identifi ed as the source of a high propor-
tion of preventable adverse events. A decade ago most of these would have been 
considered unavoidable or ascribed, generally incorrectly, as due to poor individual 
practice (Calland et al.  2002 ; Vincent et al.  2004 ). Studies of process failures, com-
munication, teamwork, interruptions and distractions have now identifi ed multiple 
vulnerabilities in surgical care. Given the inherent unreliability of the system it now 
seems remarkable that there are so few adverse events, which is probably testament 
to the resilience and powers of recovery of clinical staff (Wears et al.  2015 ). Many 
surgical units are now moving beyond the undoubted gains of checklists to consider 
the wider surgical system and the need for a more sophisticated understanding of 
surgical teamwork in both the operating theatre and the wider healthcare system 
(de Vries et al.  2010 ). 
 A considerable number of interventions of different kinds have shown that errors 
can be reduced and processes made more reliable. Interventions such as computer 
order entry, standardisation and simplifi cation of processes and systematic hando-
ver have all been shown to improve reliability, and in some cases reduce harm, in 
specifi c contexts. We have however relatively few examples of large scale interven-
tions which have made a demonstrable impact on patient safety, the two most nota-
ble exceptions being the reduction of central line infections in Michigan and the 
introduction of the WHO surgical safety checklist (Pronovost et al.  2006 ; Haynes 
et al.  2009 ) (Table  1.1 ).
 While specifi c interventions have been shown to be effective it has proved 
much more diffi cult to improve safety across organisations. The United Kingdom 
Safer Patients Initiative, which engaged some of the acknowledged leaders in the 
fi eld, was one of the largest and most carefully studied intervention programmes. 
The programme was successful in many respects, in that it engaged and energised 
staff and produced pockets of sustained improvement. However it failed to dem-
onstrate large scale change on a variety of measures of culture, process and out-
comes (Benning et al.  2011 ). Similarly, where studies have attempted to assess 
safety across a whole healthcare system, the fi ndings have generally been disap-
pointing. Longitudinal record review studies in the United States, France have 
shown no improvement in patient safety although there have recently been encour-
aging results from Netherlands (Landrigan et al.  2010 ; Michel et al.  2011 ; Baines 
et al.  2015 ) 
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3 Compared to a decade ago, we now have a good understanding of the phenom-
enology of error and harm, a considerable amount of epidemiological data, some 
understanding of the causes of harm, demonstrations of the effi cacy of certain inter-
ventions and the effectiveness of a few. We do not have clear evidence of wide 
sustained change or widespread improvements in the safety of healthcare systems. 
All in all, progress looks reasonable if not spectacular. Given the level of resources 
allocated to safety, still tiny in comparison with biomedicine, progress looks reason-
ably good. 
 We believe that the concept of patient safety we are working with is too narrow 
and that future progress, particularly outside hospitals, will require a broader vision. 
In the remainder of this chapter we set out some challenges and confusions that we 
regard as particularly critical. These provide both the motivation for our work 
together and also an introduction to our approach. 
 Harm Has Been Defined Too Narrowly 
 We agree with those who seek to provide a more positive vision of safety (Hollnagel 
 2014 ). The punitive approach sometimes taken by governments, regulators and the 
media is, for the most part, deeply unfair and damaging. Healthcare while enor-
mously benefi cial is, like many other important industries, also inherently hazard-
ous. Treating patients safely as well as effectively should be regarded as an 
achievement and celebrated. 
 We make no apologies however for continuing to focus on harm as the touch-
stone for patient safety and the motivation for our work. We will put up with errors 
and problems in our care, to some extent at least, as long as we do not come to harm 
 Table 1.1  Progress in patient safety over two decades 
 Where we were (1995)  Where we are now (2015) 
 Foundations  Incident reporting, continuous 
improvement and development of 
best practice 
 Largely unchanged. More 
translation and use of industrial 
approaches to safety, increased 
attention to incident analysis, 
learning and feedback 
 Defi nition  Harm defi ned from a professional 
standpoint, rooted in a medico-legal 
and insurance perspective. Narrow 
vision of causality, direct association 
between technical care and harm 
 Patient safety still linked to a 
medico-legal perspective. Broader 
understanding of human error and 
organisational infl uences 
 Perimeter of 
inclusion 
 Dominant technical vision of care, 
improved clinical protocols as main 
priority for improving safety 
 Recognition of the importance of 
human factors and human sciences. 
Organisational factors and safety 
culture are additional priorities for 
safety 
 Measurement  Counting incidents and adverse 
events 
 Largely unchanged 
Harm Has Been Defi ned Too Narrowly
4and the overall benefi ts clearly outweigh any problems we may encounter. Many 
errors do not lead to harm and may even be necessary to the learning and mainte-
nance of safety. Surgeons, for example, may make several minor errors during a 
procedure, none of which really compromise the patient’s safety or the fi nal out-
come of the operation. 
 Patient safety, particularly the large scale studies of adverse events, has its ori-
gins in a medico-legal concept of harm. We have, for the most part, now separated 
the concept of harm from that of negligence which is an important achievement, 
though we still tend to think of safety as being the absence of specifi c harmful or 
potential harmful events (Runciman et al.  2009 ). Harm can also result from loss of 
opportunity due to a combination of poor care and poor coordination whether 
inside the hospital, at the transition with primary care, or over a long period of 
time in the community. Evidence is growing that many patients suffer harm, in the 
sense that their disease progresses untreated, through diagnostic error and delay 
(Graber  2013 ; Singh et al.  2014 ). In some contexts, this would simply be seen as 
poor quality care falling below the accepted standard. But for the patient a serious 
failure can lead to untreated or unrecognised disease and, from their perspective, 
to harm. 
 Box 1.1 Safety Words and Concepts 
 The term ‘medical error’ has been used in a variety of ways, often as short-
hand for a poor outcome. We use the term error is in its everyday sense as a 
retrospective judgement that an action or omission by a person did not achieve 
the intended outcome. We use the term reliability when considering processes 
and systems rather than the actions of people. 
 The aims of the patient safety movement can be stated in a number of dif-
ferent ways:
•  To reduce harm to patients, both physical and psychological 
•  To eliminate preventable harm 
•  To reduce medical error 
•  To improve reliability 
•  To achieve a safe system 
 All these are reasonable objectives but they are subtly different. We sug-
gest that the central aim must be to prevent or at least reduce harm to patients, 
while acknowledging that the concept of harm is diffi cult to defi ne and other 
objectives are also valid. As the book develops we will suggest that the most 
productive way to approach patient safety is to view it as the management of 
risk over time in order to maximise benefi t and minimise harm to patients in 
the healthcare system. 
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and that we need to think about harm much more broadly and within the overall 
context of the benefi ts of treatment. As the book evolves, we endeavour to develop 
a different vision which is more rooted in the experience of patients. As patients, the 
critical question for us is to weigh up the potential benefi ts against the potential 
harms which may, or may not, be preventable. While we certainly want to avoid 
harmful incidents, we are ultimately concerned with the longer term balance of 
benefi t and harm that accrues over months or years or even over a lifetime. 
 Safety Is a Moving Target 
 Safety is, in a number of respects, a constantly moving target. As standards improve 
and concern for safety grows within a system, a larger number of events will come 
to be considered as safety issues. In a very real sense innovation and improving 
standards create new forms of harm in that there are new ways the healthcare system 
can fail patients. 
 In the 1950s many complications of healthcare were recognised, at least by 
some, but largely viewed as the inevitable consequences of medical intervention 
(Sharpe and Faden  1998 ). Gradually, certain types of incidents have come to seem 
both unacceptable and potentially preventable. The clearest example in recent times 
is healthcare-associated infection, which is no longer viewed as an unfortunate side 
effect of healthcare. With increased understanding of underlying processes, mecha-
nisms of transmission and methods of prevention, coupled with major public and 
regulatory pressure, such infections are becoming unacceptable to both patients and 
professionals (Vincent and Amalberti  2015 ). 
 In the last 10 years, as more types of harm have come to be regarded as prevent-
able, the perimeter of patient safety has expanded. A larger number of harmful 
events are now regarded as ‘unacceptable’. In addition to infections we could now 
include, in the British NHS, pressure ulcers, falls, venous thromboembolism and 
catheter associated urinary tract infections. In the United Kingdom the Francis 
Report into Mid Staffordshire Hospitals NHS Trust highlighted additional risks to 
patients, such as malnutrition, dehydration and delirium all of which are now being 
viewed as safety issues. We should also consider adverse drug reactions in the com-
munity that cause admission to hospital, polypharmacy and general harm from over- 
treatment. All these, in the past, might have been regretted but are now receiving 
greater attention through being viewed under the safety umbrella. 
 The perimeter of safety is therefore expanding but this does not mean that health-
care is becoming less safe. A long-standing concern with safety in such specialties 
as anaesthesia and obstetrics is actually a marker of the high standards these special-
ties have achieved. Safety is an aspiration to better care and labelling an issue as a 
safety issue is a strongly motivational, sometimes emotional, plea that such out-
comes cannot and should not be tolerated (Vincent and Amalberti  2015 ). 
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 Patient safety has evolved and developed in the context of hospital care. The under-
standing we have of the epidemiology of error and harm, the causes and contribu-
tory factors and the potential solutions are almost entirely hospital based. The 
concepts which guided the study of safety in hospitals remain relevant in primary 
and community care but new taxonomies and new approaches may be required in 
these more distributed forms of healthcare delivery (Brami and Amalberti  2010 ; 
Amalberti and Brami  2012 ). 
 Care provided in a person’s home is an important context for healthcare delivery 
but patient safety in the home has not been addressed in a systematic manner. The 
home environment may pose substantial risks to patients, greater in some cases than 
in the hospital environment. Safety in the context of a patient’s home care is likely 
to require different concepts, approaches and solutions to those developed in the 
hospital setting. This is because of the different environment, roles, responsibilities, 
standards, supervision and regulatory context in home care. Critical differences are 
that patients and carers are autonomous and are increasingly taking on professional 
roles; they rather than the professional become the potential source of medical error. 
Additionally, stressful and potentially hazardous conditions, such as poor lighting, 
mean that socio-economic conditions take on a much greater importance. 
 In both primary care and care at home the risks to patients are rather different 
from those in hospital, being much more concerned with omissions of care, failure 
to monitor over long time periods and lack of access to care. These areas have not 
traditionally fallen within the area of patient safety but are undoubtedly sources of 
potential harm to patients. The concept of the patient safety incident, and even of 
adverse events, breaks down in these settings or is at least stretched to its limit. 
Suppose, to take just one example, a patient is hospitalised after taking an incorrect 
dose of warfarin for 4 months. The admission to hospital could be viewed as an 
incident or a preventable adverse event. This description however hardly does jus-
tice to 4 months of increasing debility and ill health culminating in a hospital admis-
sion. In reality, the admission to hospital is the beginning of the recovery process 
and a sign that the healthcare system is at last meeting the needs of this patient. The 
episode needs to be seen not as an isolated incident but as an evolving and pro-
longed failure in the care provided to this person. 
 We Are Approaching Safety in the Same Way in All Settings 
 ‘But we are not like aviation’ someone will inevitably say in any discussion of the 
value of learning from commercial aviation and comparing approaches to safety in 
different sectors. Well no, healthcare is not like aviation in any simple sense. But 
some aspects of healthcare are comparable to some aspects of aviation. An surgical 
operation does not have a great deal in common with a commercial fl ight but the 
pre-fl ight checking process is comparable to the pre-operation checking process and 
so learning how aviation manages those checks is instructive. 
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need to be approached differently from safety in commercial aviation. The whole-
sale transfer of aviation approaches to healthcare at the very least requires consider-
able adaptation; crew resource management acted as an inspiration to surgical and 
anaesthetics teams but surgical team training has now developed its own style and 
history (Gaba  2000 ; Sevdalis et al.  2009 ). We now need to go further and consider 
a still more important issue which is that safety may need to be approached differ-
ently in different areas of healthcare. Specialty specifi c approaches (Croskerry et al. 
 2009 ) are emerging but models, methods and interventions do not often distinguish 
between settings. 
 Healthcare is a particularly complex environment. We might say that healthcare 
is 20 different industries under one banner. Consider the hospital environment with 
multiple types of work, many different professions and varying working conditions 
across clinical environments. There are areas of highly standardized care such as 
pharmacy, radiotherapy, nuclear medicine and much of the process of blood transfu-
sion. All of these are highly standardized and rely heavily on automation and infor-
mation technology. They are islands of reliability within the much more chaotic 
wider hospital environment. On the ward standards and protocols provide important 
controls on hazards (such as infection from poor hand hygiene) but day-to-day con-
ditions demand constant adaptation and fl exibility. Other sections of the hospital, 
such as the emergency department, continually have to deal with unpredictable 
patients fl ow and workloads; their activity needs considerable hour-by-hour adapta-
tion because of the huge variety of patients, the complexity of their conditions and 
the vulnerabilities of the healthcare system. 
 The risks and the nature of the work vary across all these settings. In spite of this 
we are essentially using the same concepts, the same analytic toolbox and the same 
suite of interventions in all settings. Many of these approaches can be customised 
and adapted to different settings. However we will argue later in the book that risk 
needs to be managed in very different ways in different environments and that the 
approach of, for instance, commercial aviation is very different from that of profes-
sionals working in more fl uid risky environments such as fi re-fi ghters. In healthcare 
we may have to adapt our approach to safety according to the nature of the work, the 
working conditions and use a variety of underlying models of safety. 
 Our Model of Intervention Is Limited 
 The most dramatic safety improvements so far demonstrated have been those with 
a strong focus on a core clinical issue and a relatively narrow timescale. These inter-
ventions, such as the surgical safety checklist and the control of central line infec-
tions, are of course far from simple in the sense that they have only succeeded 
because of a sophisticated approach to clinical engagement and implementation. 
More general system improvements may extend to an entire patient pathway. For 
instance the introduction of the SURPASS system using checklists and other 
improvements to communication along the entire surgical pathway and showed a 
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8reduction in surgery complications (de Vries et al.  2010 ). Bar coding and other 
systems have massively enhanced the reliability of blood transfusion systems, 
incrementally improving each step of the pathway (Murphy et al.  2013 ). 
 We should however be wary of modelling all future safety interventions on our 
most visible successes. At the moment the primary focus is on developing interven-
tions to address specifi c harms or to improve reliability at specifi c points in a care 
process. This, entirely reasonable, approach is evolving to include the reliability of 
entire care pathways or areas of care (such as an out-patient clinic). We will argue 
however that, in addition to increasing reliability, we also need to develop proactive 
strategies to manage risk on an ongoing basis, particularly in less controlled envi-
ronments. There is also a class of strategies and interventions, particularly those that 
focus on detecting and responding to deviations, that are particularly critical for 
preventing harm to patients. These approaches do not feature as strongly in the clas-
sical quality and safety armament. 
 We also need to recognise that safety, for any person or organisation, is always 
only one of a number of objectives. For instance, many sports involve an element 
of risk and potential harm. When we become patients we necessarily accept the 
risks of healthcare in pursuit of other benefi ts. Similarly a healthcare organisation 
can never treat safety as the sole objective, even if they say safety is their ‘top pri-
ority’. Of necessity, safety is always only one consideration in a broader endeav-
our, whether in healthcare or in any other fi eld. As an oil executive expressed it: 
‘Safety is not our top priority. Getting oil out of the ground is our priority. However, 
when safety and productivity confl ict, then safety takes precedence’ (Vincent 
 2010 ). Similarly, in healthcare, the main objective is providing healthcare to large 
numbers of people at a reasonable cost, but this needs to be done as safely as 
possible. 
 Healthcare Is Changing 
 We have argued that, for a variety of reasons, we need to expand our view of patient 
safety. This argument has been made from our understanding of current healthcare 
systems. However we also believe that the rapid evolution of healthcare, combined 
with increasing fi nancial pressures, brings an additional urgency to the quest for a 
new vision. 
 Outcomes of care have improved rapidly all over the world. People now survive 
illnesses, such as myocardial infarction and stroke, which were once fatal. As the 
effectiveness of healthcare improves, increasing numbers of patients are ageing 
with their illness under control. Current projections suggest that by 2030 as many as 
25 % of the population in many countries may surviving into their 90s. In many 
cases an illness which was once fatal has become a chronic condition with all the 
related implications for the individual, society and the healthcare system. The treat-
ment of chronic conditions (such as diabetes, respiratory diseases, depression, car-
diac and renal disease) is now the major priority. The phenomenal increase in 
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care systems and the general increase in multiple comorbidities and more complex 
health problems places huge stress on healthcare systems. The question of what 
‘best practice’ actually is for any individual patient is itself becoming a very diffi -
cult issue. 
 The impact on global cost of healthcare is considerable, with average costs 
increasing by 1 % of national gross domestic product (GDP) between 2000 and 
2013 ( World Bank ). By 2030 there may be 30 % more patients with chronic condi-
tions which might require a further increase in funding of between 2 and 4 % of 
GDP, depending on the approach taken by the country in question. There is a major 
risk that by 2030, institutional care for the aged will be unaffordable and that, in the 
absence of alternatives, there will be a crisis of quality in care for the aged. While 
alternative systems are evolving there could be if anything an increased risk of fail-
ures and harm to patients. 
 The need for healthcare to evolve and adapt is to a very large extent the conse-
quence of the successes of modern medicine. The focus of care needs to move rap-
idly from high quality care in hospitals to a focus on the entire patient journey over 
years or even over a lifetime. These changes are long overdue but becoming increas-
ingly urgent. The shift to the management of care over long time periods and many 
settings has a number of consequences with implications for safety. Patients stay in 
hospital less time, live at home for years with their disease, with a consequent trans-
fer of responsibility from hospitals to primary care. This requires effective coordi-
nation across all health care organisations, in particular at the transition points, in 
order to mitigate risk and enable positive outcomes. Reducing complexity is 
crucial. 
 Finally, patients are more knowledgeable and informed than previously. They are 
increasingly aware of their rights to information and access. The public expects a 
system that meets their needs in a holistic and integrated way, with a seamless sys-
tem of effective communication between transition points. Last but not least there is 
an increasing emphasis on the prevention of disease and the maintenance of health. 
This turns the concept of the patient journey into the concept of the citizen or person 
journey. 
 The combination of austerity, rising healthcare costs, rising standards and 
increased demand will place huge pressures on healthcare systems which will 
increase the likelihood of serious breakdowns in care. At the same time innovations 
in the delivery of care in the home and community, while providing new benefi ts, 
will also create new forms of risk. Our current models of safety are not well adapted 
to this new landscape. 
 In this chapter we identifi ed a number of challenges for patient safety. In the next 
three chapters we begin to consider how these challenges are to be met and establish 
the foundations for the more practical and strategic chapters that follow later in the 
book. First however we build the foundations beginning with the simple idea that 
care given to patients is of varying standard and, equally important, that the care 
given to any one patient varies considerably along their journey. 
Healthcare Is Changing
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